Sphota

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The term sphoTa   is etymologically derived from the root sphuT, which means 'to burst', or become suddenly rent asunder (with a sound)

 The word sphoTa   is explained in two ways 

1. Naagesha BhaTTa defines sphoTa as sphuTati prakaashate'rtho'smaad iti sphoTaH (that, from which the meaning bursts forth, that is, shines forth. In other words, the word

that expresses a meaning, or the process of expressing a meaning through a word is called sphoTa. 
2. SphoTa, according to Maadhava, is that which is manifested or revealed by the phonemes: sphuTyate vyajyate varNairiti sphoTaH.

A UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIAN GRAMMARIANS

 Gaurinatha Shastri suggested that the original Greek conception of logos best conveys the meaning of sphoTa: 'The fact that logos stand for an idea as well as a word wonderfully approximates to the concept of sphoTa' [iii]. The concept of

sphoTa

 is the unique contribution of Indian grammarians to the philosophy of language. This is the theory, which explains the working of the speech process. We do not have sufficient evidence, in our hand to establish as to who was the first founder of the sphoTa theory. Haradatta in his PadamaNjari and Naagesha BhaTTa in his sphoTavaada claim that the sphoTaayana was the first founder of the sphoTa doctrine [iv].

VARIOUS VIEWS ON SPHOTA

 VyaaDi, the author of

samgraha 

, might have recorded some discussion about the sphoTa theory; as the distinction between the

praakrta dhvani

 and

vaikrta dhvani

 mentioned in the Vaakya Padeeya is supposed to have been made by him [v]. Some scholars believe that the indirect reference to sphoTa theory is found in the writings of AudumbaraayaNa quoted by Yaaska in his Nirukta [vi]. Here it should be noted that Yaaska did not use the term sphoTa and he seems to have known little about it. AudumbaraayaNa also does not mention the term sphoTa directly. His awareness of sphoTa is speculated on the basis of the sphoTa concept of Bhartrhari. (See my earlier articles in Language in India, 

The Notion of Vaak in Vaakyapadeeya

 and 

Bhartrhari -- the Father of Indian Semantics

.) Some grammarians even claimed that the germs of the sphoTa theory are present in PaaNini's

ASTaadhyaayee 

 [vii], as he mentions the name of

sphoTaayana

. The specific mention of the name

sphoTaayana

, neither sufficiently indicates that PaaNini knew anything similar to the sphoTa theory, nor does it point out that this doctrine originally belonged to the sage sphoTaayana. The Vaartikakaara, Kaatyaayana does not mention the word sphoTa in his Vt. He only established the great principle that shabda is nitya ("eternal, or permanent"), artha is nitya, and their mutual relation i.e. vaacya- vaacaka-bhaava is also nitya [viii]. While explaining upon PaaNinian rule taparastatkaalasya, P.1.1.70, he says that the letters are fixed and the style of vrtti depends upon the speech habits of the speaker. This statement of Kaatyaayana, regarding the nature of word and the difference in tempo takes us near to the sphoTa doctrine.

PATANJALI ON SPHOTA -- THE FLAME AND THE FIRE

 Here it should be admitted that though earlier thinkers talk of the eternal and pervasive character of word, as an element or unit, the clear picture of sphoTa theory is not found before PataNjali. He discuses the idea of sphoTa, under P-1.1.170 (taparastatkaalasya), and P-8.2.18 (krpo ro laH), where the word sphoTa is not applied to the meaning bearing element, but to a permanent aspect of phonemes.  According to PataNjali, sphoTa is not identical with shabda. It is rather a permanent element of shabda, whereas dhvani represents its non-permanent aspect. The sphoTa is not audible like dhvani [ix]. It is manifested by the articulated sounds. The dhvani element of speech may differ in phonetic value with reference to the variation in the utterance of different speakers. Differences in speed of utterance and time distinctions are attributes of dhvani, which can not affect the nature of sphoTa revealed by the sound. When a sound passes from a speaker's lips, sphoTa is revealed instantaneously. But before the listener comprehends anything, dhvani elements manifest the permanent element of shabda. So, sphoTa comes first and manifesting dhvani also continues to exist after the revelation of sphoTa. That is why PataNjali remarks that dhvani-s are actualized and euphemeral elements and attributes of sphoTa [x]. PataNjali points out that the sphoTa, which is revealed by the articulate sounds, can be presented through phonemes only. A phoneme (vowel) which represents sphoTa remains the same in three modes of utterance, i.e. slow, fast and faster, whereas dhvani (articulate sound) differs in different utterances [xi]. It is just like the distance, which remains the same, even if it is covered by various means, which travel slow, fast, and faster. Regarding the unaffected nature of sphoTa, PataNjali gives the analogy of a drumbeat. When a drum is struck, one drumbeat may travel twenty feet, another thirty feet, another forty feet and so on. Though the sounds produced by beating the drum differ, the drumbeat remains the same. SphoTa is precisely of such and such a size, the increase and decrease in step is caused by the difference in the duration of dhvani [xii].  According to PataNjali, sphoTa is a conceptual entity or generic feature of articulated sounds, either in the form of isolated phonemes or a series of phonemes. It is a permanent element of physical sounds which are transitory in nature, and which vary in length, tempo and pitch of the speaker. It is an actualized replica of euphemeral sounds.

BHARTRHARI ON SPHOTA

 In interpreting the doctrine of sphoTa, Bhartrhari follows the tradition handed down by his predecessors like PataNjali and others. While explaining the notion of sphoTa, he not only gives his own view but also gives the views of others (using the quotative markers, kecit and apare) [xiii], without mentioning their names. Traditionally it is believed that they may be MImamsakas and Naiyaayikas.

comment on the political implications of the death of the author

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Death of the Author 

Many of Barthes‘s works focus on literature. However, Barthes denied being a literary critic, because he did not assess and provide verdicts on works. Instead, he interpreted their semiotic significance. Barthes‘s structuralist style of literary analysis has influenced cultural studies, to the chagrin of adherents of traditional literary approaches.

One notable point of controversy is Barthes‘s proclamation of the ‗death of the author‘. This death‘ is directed, not at the idea of writing, but at the specifically French image of

the auteur  as a creative genius expressing an inner vision. He is opposing a view of texts as expressing a distinct personality of the author. Barthes vehemently opposes the view that authors consciously create masterpieces. He maintains that authors such as Racine and Balzac often reproduce emotional patterns about which they have no conscious knowledge. He opposes the view that authors should be interpreted in terms of what they think they‘re doing. Their biographies have no more relevance to what they write than do those of scientists.

In  The Death of the Author‘, Barthes argues that writing destroys every voice and point of origin. This is because it occurs within a functional process which is the practice of signification itself. Its real origin is language. A writer, therefore, does not have a special genius expressed in the text, but rather, is a kind of craftsman who is skilled in using a particular code. All writers are like copywriters or scribes, inscribing a particular zone of language. The real origin of a text is not the author, but language. If the writer expresses

something ‗inner‘, it is only the dictionary s/he holds ready formed. There is a special art of the storyteller to translate linguistic structures or codes into particular narratives or messages. Each text is composed of multiple writings brought into dialogue, with each code it refers to being extracted from a previous culture.

Barthes‘s argument is directed against schools of literary criticism that seek to uncover the author‘s meaning as a hidden referent which is the final meaning of the text. By refusing the ‗author‘ (in the sense of a great writer expressing an inner brilliance), one refuses to assign an ultimate meaning to the text, and hence, one refuses to fix its meaning. It becomes open to different readings. According to Barthes, the unity of a text lies in its destination not its origin. Its multiplicity is focused on the reader, as an absent point within the text, to whom it speaks. The writer and reader are linguistic persons, not psychological persons. Their role in the story is defined by their coded place in discourse, not their specific traits.

  A text cannot have a single meaning, but rather, is composed of multiple systems through which it is constructed. In Barthes‘s case, this means reading texts through the signs they use, both in their structure in the text, and in their wider meanings. Literature does not represent something real, since what it refers to is not really there. For Barthes, it works by playing on the multiple systems of language-use and their infinite transcribability  –  their ability to be written in different ways. The death of the author creates freedom for the reader to interpret the text. The reader can recreate the text through connecting to its meanings as they appear in different contexts. In practice, Barthes‘s literary works emphasise the practice of the craft of writing. For in stance, Barthes‘s structuralist analysis of Sade, Fourier and Loyola emphasises the structural characteristics of their work, such as their emphasis on counting and their locations in self-contained worlds. He views the three authors as founders of languages (logothetes).

http://www.novelguide.com/aristotles-poetics/summaries/chapter5-6

Tragedy is a process of imitation with serious implications, created with sensuous language, and presented by actors, its well-crafted language incorporating a blend of rhythm and melody, while also mixing spoken verses and song. Tragedy arouses in the audience the emotions of pity and fear, and evokes a catharis of such emotions. Tragedy is composed of six main elements, which are, in order of decreasing importance: plot (mythos), character (ethos), thought (dianoia), speech (lexis), melody (melos), and spectacle (opsis).

The most important element of tragedy is plot. Because tragedy imitates life and action, rather than men, the tone of tragedy is defined by its actions, even while its morality may be determined by character. Because a tragedy can exist without character but not without plot, plot is essential. According to Aristotle, many contemporary comedies were composed without character, but none existed without plot. The reflective or expressive speeches of a work’s characters cannot alone be the basis of tragedy. By emphasizing character at the expense of plot, a drama is like a painting with a random scattering of bright colors that would lack the definition and coherence of a simple black-and-white outline. In addition to providing structure, plot is the most basic device for manipulating the audience’s feelings.

The importance of plot can also be demonstrated by the fact that beginning poets are usually better able to perfect their verbal expression and their definition of character before they are able to construct coherent plots, suggesting the difficulty of creating a convincing plot.

Plot is thus the heart of tragedy, always superior to character. After plot, and then character, the third most important element of tragedy is “thought,” indicating the way that characters speak and convey their point of view through command of rhetoric. “Character” refers to a kind of speech that reveals a person’s morality through a defined choice, while “thought” refers to a more abstract type of argument. The fourth element, verbal expression, refers to the way thought is demonstrated through language. The least important aspects of tragedy are music and the visual. Tragedy, Aristotle argues, still has an impact even when it not performed because the aural and visual elements are secondary.

In these sections, Aristotle further explores the formal qualities and origins of comedy, epic, and tragedy. He reiterates the distinction he makes earlier between poetic forms and types of imitation, noting that comedy is inherently a form that represents low culture, a form that focuses on characters that can be described as ugly or ludicrous. (This is not a definition that would be accepted by modern playwrights or audiences.) Still, Aristotle observes, comedy usually avoids representing the truly ugly aspects of life, experiences that might be considered painful or violent, and that would work better as subjects of tragedy. Aristotle also traces the origins of the form of comedy, observing that because comedy wasn’t observed as closely or taken as seriously as tragedy, the precise way that its forms came about is not known, though he does refer to some of the elements that have become established—masks, prologues, groups of actors, and plots, and cites the Athenian Crates as the originator of the latter.

Going on to distinguish between epic and tragedy, Aristotle observes that epic has much in common with tragedy, following its example in both form and content, while also noting several key differences between the two.

Key to this section is Aristotle’s identification of the six elements that make up tragedy. These are: plot, character, thought, speech, melody, and spectacle. The most important element, according to Aristotle, is plot, because no tragedy can exist without it. Plot provides the most basic structure the poet can embellish with the other elements of tragedy. Character is also important. The aural and the visual elements are less important for Aristotle.

Aristotle - Plot - http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/poetics/section3.rhtml

Aristotle asserts that any tragedy can be divided into six component parts, and that every tragedy is made up of these six parts with nothing else besides. There is (a) the spectacle, which is the overall visual appearance of the stage and the actors. The means of imitation (language, rhythm, and harmony) can be divided into (b) melody, and (c) diction, which has to do with the composition of the verses. The agents of the action can be understood in terms of (d) character and (e) thought. Thought seems to denote the intellectual qualities of an agent while character seems to denote the moral qualities of an agent. Finally, there is (f) the plot, or mythos, which is the combination of incidents and actions in the story.

Aristotle argues that, among these six, the plot is the most important. The characters serve to advance the action of the story, not vice versa. The ends we pursue in life, our happiness and our misery, all take the form of action. That is, according to Aristotle, happiness consists in a certain kind of activity rather than in a certain quality of character. Diction and thought are also less significant than plot: a series of well-written speeches have nothing like the force of a well-structured tragedy. Further, Aristotle suggests, the most powerful elements in a tragedy, theperipeteia and the anagnorisis, are elements of the plot. Lastly, Aristotle notes that forming a solid plot is far more difficult than creating good characters or diction.

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman

by Mary Wollstonecraft

http://www.enotes.com/topics/vindication-rights-woman/critical-essays/vindication-rights-woman-mary-wollstonecraft

Major Themes

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman argues for equality for women and girls not only in the political sphere but in the social realm as well. It asks readers to reconsider prevailing notions about women's abilities. Some of the main issues that Wollstonecraft emphasizes are education, virtues, passion versus reason, and power. She argues that the current roles and education of women do women more harm than good and urges reform that would provide women with broader and deeper learning. She also discusses the virtues that will develop a “true” civilization. However, she rejects traditional notions of feminine “virtue” and sees virtues not as sexual traits but as human qualities. She also insists that intellect, or reason, and not emotion, or passion, be the guiding force in human conduct. Society's association of women with emotionality and thus vulnerability must to be countered, she argues, by the use of reason and engagement in strenuous mental activity. In A Vindication of the Rights of Woman Wollstonecraft talks a great deal about power—in terms of the status quo, in regards to women's position in society, and so on—but ultimately what she urges is for women to have power not over men but over themselves.

Critical Reception

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was much acclaimed in radical political circles when it was published, but it also attracted considerable hostility. The statesman Horace Walpole, for example, called Wollstonecraft “a hyena in petticoats,” and for most of the nineteenth century the book was ignored because of its scandalous reputation. Beginning in the late twentieth century, literary critics and philosophers began to take great interest in Wollstonecraft's treatise as one of the founding works of feminism. Some issues discussed by commentators of Wollstonecraft's treatise are the author's attitude toward sexuality, ideas about education, the role of reason versus passion, attitudes toward slavery, the relevance of the work to contemporary struggles for rights, the unflattering portrayal of women, and the status of the work as a foundational feminist text.

Mary Wollstonecraft on education

http://infed.org/mobi/mary-wollstonecraft-on-education/

Mary Wollstonecraft on education. Mary Wollstonecraft has long been appreciated as a major political thinker – but she also made important contributions to educational theory and practice. Barry Burke investigates.

contents: introduction · Mary Wollstonecraft on education · conclusion ·bibliography · how to cite this article. See, also in the archives Mary Wollstonecraft on national education from A Vindication of the Rights of Women.

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97) was born in Spitalfields in 1759. Her father uprooted the family on a number of occasions and during her formative years Mary Wollstonecraft was to find herself in Epping, Barking, Beverley in Yorkshire, back to East London in Hoxton and then out again to Wales. At the age of 18, having received a poor education, she left home and never went back.

She became a companion to a widow in Bath for a short period, then moved back to London (first to Fulham and then to Hackney). In 1784, at the age of 24 Mary Wollstonecraft opened up her own school for girls at Newington Green. This did not last long and she finally became a governess to the children of an aristocratic family on their estate in Ireland. This, in turn, was another short appointment and in 1787, Mary Wollstonecraft finally came back to London and settled in George Street just south of Blackfriars Bridge.

Five minutes walk away was St. Pauls’ Churchyard which, at the time, was the centre of the publishing trade. Mary Wollstonecraft was given work by Joseph Johnson, a radical and progressive publisher and spent most of her waking hours in his shop, writing and translating, as well as eating her meals and meeting a whole range of radical intellectuals and progressive thinkers. Gradually, Mary became part of a circle of friends who were constantly discussing the political affairs of the day.

In 1786, Mary Wollstonecraft wrote a short tract entitled Thoughts on the Education of Daughters but it was the advent of the French Revolution in 1789 that brought Mary into the public eye. As is well known, the Revolution was welcomed by many radicals throughout Europe. The new Republic’s principles of liberty, equality and fraternity were seen as opening a new chapter in the struggle against aristocracy and for a democratic society. Reaction in this country from the wealthy aristocracy and their followers was vitriolic. Supporters of the Revolution were viewed as dangerous subversives and were attacked at every opportunity.

The first major critique was Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France which both attacked the Revolution and its supporters in this country. On reading it, Mary Wollstonecraft decided to respond writing A Vindication of the Rights of Man – a defence of the Revolution and its principles. The book, published in 1790, was not particularly well written although it became very popular and made her name known. Soon after Mary Wollstonecraft’s book came out, Tom Paine wrote his classic The Rights of Man. In 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft produced A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. It was a significant milestone in the arguments around women’s rights and has since become a feminist classic. It was translated into French almost immediately and brought Mary Wollstonecraft fame not only in this country but also on the continent and in the United States.

Mary Wollstonecraft was not, however, to build on her fame or to write anything else of note. Five years after the book was published and shortly after her marriage to William Godwin, Mary died giving birth to a baby daughter – Mary. As is well known, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin was later to marry the poet Shelley and as Mary Shelley, became famous as the author of the great gothic novel Frankenstein.

Mary Wollstonecraft on education

So why should Mary Wollstonecraft be of any great importance as an educational thinker?

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is more often than not regarded as a purely political treatise. However, like Plato’s Republic and Rousseau’s Emile, it can be seen as both a political and an educational treatise.

It is above all a celebration of the rationality of women. It constitutes an attack on the view of female education put forward by Rousseau and countless others who regarded women as weak and artificial and not capable of reasoning effectively. Mary Wollstonecraft rejected the education in dependency that Rousseauadvocated for them in Emile. A woman must be intelligent in her own right, she argued. She cannot assume that her husband will be intelligent! Mary Wollstonecraft maintained that this did not contradict the role of the woman as a mother or a carer or of the role of the woman in the home. She maintained that ‘meek wives are, in general, foolish mothers’.

Reason was her starting point. For Mary Wollstonecraft, rationality or reason formed the basis of our human rights as it was our ability to grasp truth and therefore acquire knowledge of right and wrong that separated us, as human beings, from the animal world. Through the exercise of reason we became moral and political agents. This world-view was acknowledged by all progressive thinkers of the time. However, it was essentially a man’s world and the work of Rousseau was typical of this. What Mary Wollstonecraft did was extend the basic ideas of Enlightenment philosophy to women and Rousseau’s educational ideas of how to educate boys to girls.

She set about arguing against the assumption that women were not rational creatures and were simply slaves to their passions. Mary Wollstonecraft argued that it was up to those who thought like this to prove it. She described the process by which parents brought their daughters up to be docile and domesticated. She maintained that if girls were encouraged from an early age to develop their minds, it would be seen that they were rational creatures and there was no reason whatsoever for them not to be given the same opportunities as boys with regard to education and training. Women could enter the professions and have careers just the same as men.

In proposing the same type of education for girls as that proposed for boys, Mary Wollstonecraft also went a step further and proposed that they be educated together which was even more radical than anything proposed before. The idea of co-educational schooling was simply regarded as nonsense by many educational thinkers of the time.

It was fashionable to contend that if women were educated and not docile creatures, they would lose any power they had over their husbands. Mary Wollstonecraft was furious about this and maintained that ‘This is the very point I aim at. I do not wish them to have power over men but over themselves’.

The most perfect education, in my opinion, is such an exercise of the understanding as is best calculated to strengthen the body and form the heart. Or, in other words, to enable the individual to attain such habits of virtue as will render it independent. In fact, it is a farce to call any being virtuous whose virtues do not result from the exercise of its own reason. This was Rousseau’s opinion respecting men: I extend it to women.

Mary Wollstonecraft – A Vindication of the Rights of Woman

Mary Wollstonecraft favoured co-educational day schools, lessons given by informal conversational methods, with lots of physical exercise both free and organised. She had a picture of an ideal family where the babies were nourished by an intelligent mother and not sent away to nurses and then to boarding school and fathers were friends to their children rather than tyrants. Essentially family members were all regarded as rational beings and children should be able to judge their parents like anyone else. Family relationships therefore became educational ones.

Conclusion

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman covered a wide range of topics relating to the condition of women. Not only did she argue for women’s equality with men in education but she also called for their equality within the law as well as their right to parliamentary representation. As Jane Roland Martin has commented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reformers looked to coeducational schooling – and it became a ‘fact of life’ for many millions of people. The problem is that ‘this great historical development turned out to be a carrier of old inequities and the creator of new problems for women’ (2001: 71-2). Not only is it necessary to ensure that coeducation is ‘girl and women friendly’ it is also necessary to design education for both sexes that ‘incorporates the virtues of rationality and self-governance that Rousseau attributed to men and also the virtue of patience and gentleness, zeal and affection, tenderness and care that he attributed to women’(op. cit.). Mary Wollstonecraft was a pioneer for women. She led the way for feminists and her book is a classic that still inspires many today.

Bibliography

Craciun, C. (2002) A Routledge Literary Sourcebook on Mary Wollstonecraft’s “A Vindication of the Rights of Woman”, London: Routledge

Falco, M. J. (ed.) (1996) Feminist Interpretations of Mary Wollstonecraft, Penn State University Press.

Jacobs, D. (2001). Her own woman: The life of Mary Wollstonecraft. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kelly, G. (1995) Revolutionary Feminism: The Mind and Career of Mary Wollstonecraft, New York: St. Martin’s.

Gordon, L. (2005). Mary Wollstonecraft: A new genus. London: Little, Brown.

Johnson, C. L. (2002). The Cambridge companion to Mary Wollstonecraft. Cambridge companions to literature. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, J. R. (2001) ‘Mary Wollstonecraft’ in J. A. Palmer (ed.) Fifty Major Thinkers on Education. From Confucius to Dewey, London: Routledge.

Miller, C. (1999) Mary Wollstonecraft and the Rights of Women, Morgan Reynolds.

Moore, J. (1999) Mary Wollstonecraft, Northcote House Educational Publishers.

Taylor, B. (2003) Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

Todd, J. (2000) Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Tomalin, C. (1992) The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft, London: Penguin Books.

Wollstonecraft, Mary (1993) Political Writings: A Vindication of the Rights of Men; A Vindication of the Rights of Woman; and An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution, ed. by Janet Todd, Toronto.

Wollstonecraft, Mary (1993) A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, London: Penguin. Full electronic text:http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/wollstonecraft/woman-contents.html.

Wollstonecraft, Mary (1994) Maria or the Wrongs of Woman, New York: Norton.

Note: Chapter 12 ‘On National Education’ from A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is available in the informal education archives.

Acknowledgements: Picture: Mary Wollstonecraft – frontispiece of Memoirs of the author of A vindication of the rights of woman, William Godwin, 2d ed. 1798. James Heath (1757–1834), engraved from the painting of John Opie (1761–1807). Sourced from Wikmedia Commons. Believed to be in the public domain. The picture of the cover of ‘Vindication’ was sourced from Wikimedia Commons and believed to be in the public domain.

How to cite this article: Burke, B. (2004) ‘Mary Wollstonecraft on education’,the encyclopedia of informal education. [ http://infed.org/mobi/mary-wollstonecraft-on-education/. Retrieved: insert date]

© Barry Burke 2004

What Is an Intentional Fallacy?

http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-intentional-fallacy.htm

The philosophy of intentional fallacy suggests that, in literary criticism, the original meaning of the author is, perhaps, not the most important or correct interpretation of the work. In other words, there should be more freedom for the readers to interpret what they want from the information they receive. The concept is credited with first being introduced by William K. Wimsatt Jr., and Monroe Beardsley in 1946, and represents one opinion on literary criticism.

Intentional fallacy allows the readers a great deal of subjective freedom in determining what the work may say. Like anything, those readers who can make the strongest arguments to back up their points will likely receive more favourable responses. While it may seem as though this would change the meaning from what the author intended, it may or may not. If the author is clear in what is being written, readers may come to the same conclusion as the author.

Some may also apply this philosophy to other works of art, not just literature. For some works of art, interpretation is a key factor to an individual's enjoyment of that piece. Depending on how esoteric, or vague, a certain piece of art may be, it could be subject to a wide array of interpretations, especially if being viewed in a different time period than that in which it was created. Therefore, paintings, drawings, and sculptures could mean profoundly different things to different people.

Not all agree that the philosophy of intentional fallacy is correct or good. Rather, some believe the only way to truly understand a work is to try to determine the author's original intent, and the context in which it was produced. Depending on the situation, however, intentional fallacy may be a good way to come up with new and creative looks at old works.

For works of fiction and historical works, using intentional fallacy as a basis for literary criticism may provide some new insights. In some cases, the author's original intent may no longer be relevant to a reader. On the other hand, even if the original meaning is relevant, the new interpretation may better fit the reader's own personal set of circumstances.

In government, while it may not be called the same, intentional fallacy is also a philosophy some have subscribed to. Rather than trying to determine the original meaning of a legal document, such as a constitution, some may subscribe to a philosophy that discounts, at least to a certain extent, original meaning entirely. While this is not the same as a literary critique, it accomplishes the same thing philosophically, by opening up the document to reader interpretation without the limitation of trying to determine original intent.